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Treating Offshore Submerged Lands as Public Lands:
A Historical Perspective
By Robin Kundis Craig*

ABSTRACT
When President Harry Truman proclaimed federal control over the
United States’ continental shelf in 1945, he did so primarily to secure the
energy resources—oil and gas—embedded in those submerged lands.
Nevertheless, the mineral wealth of the continental shelf spurred two
critical legal battles over their control and disposition: first, whether the
federal government had any interest in the first three miles of continental
shelf; and second, if so, whether the federal government had authority to
regulate the continental shelf under traditional federal public land laws,
such as the Minerals Leasing Act. Congress’s reactions to federal courts’
resolutions of these questions, embodied in 1953 in the Submerged Lands
Act and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, continue to provide the
foundations for state and federal management of the nation’s continental
shelf and its energy resources.
Nevertheless, the Outer Continental Shelf’s status as federal
public lands remains ambiguous. This Article takes a historical approach
to assessing that issue, reviewing the traditional definition of federal
“public lands” and the historical context of the public lands issues that
arose for the Outer Continental Shelf. It concludes that the Outer
Continental Shelf, from a natural resources perspective, qualifies as the
newest of the federal public lands, but it also acknowledges that—unlike
for many other public lands—federal statutes repeatedly and consistently
exclude the states from gaining ownership of those submerged lands.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States controls vast areas of offshore territory—indeed,
including the sea around the nation’s island territories, the United States’
1
offshore interests are larger than its terrestrial interests. The resources of
these offshore areas are similarly vast and rich, from the fishery resources
of the United States’ 200-nautical-mile wide Exclusive Economic Zone
2
(EEZ) to the oil (petroleum) and natural gas resources lying beneath its
3
continental shelf. Indeed, in 1953, as the United States was first asserting
1.
U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st
Century iii, 30-31 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 USCOP Report].
2.
Id. at 274-75.
3.
Id. at 352, 353.
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clear regulatory authority over the Outer Continental Shelf, Warren
Christopher noted that “[t]he mineral resources and food potential of this
area have been said to make its acquisition more important to the nation
4
than the Louisiana Purchase.”
The United States has asserted control over its outer continental
shelf since at least 1945, when President Harry Truman issued a
5
presidential proclamation to that effect. Without question, the mineral
energy resources beneath the continental shelf have always been a
substantial motivating force for the United States to assert control over
6
those offshore submerged lands. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to view
the U.S. law of the continental shelf as the law of offshore oil and gas
development, as this Article should make clear. That law evolved once in
the 1930s through 1950s to accommodate and clarify the rules regarding
offshore oil and gas development, from regulatory jurisdiction to royalty
arrangements to leasing requirements. More recently, the law of the
continental shelf has been evolving again to acknowledge the other
potential energy resources offshore, such as offshore wind farms, thermal
7
exchange, and wave and current energy. This most recent evolution in
offshore energy law, however, builds off the first, rendering the 1930s to
1950s a particularly interesting three decades for assessing the legal status
of the continental shelf.
That status, it turns out, became and continues to be highly
contextual, particularly with regard to the status of the continental shelf as
“public lands.” As Bob Armstrong, then Assistant Secretary for Land and
Minerals, U.S. Department of the Interior, noted in 1997:

While many people do not think of the submerged lands
of our nation's outer continental shelf as public lands, the
United States has jurisdiction over the nearly 2 billion
acres of the seabed and subsoil of our submerged lands.
Congress, in 1978, declared that those lands were “a vital
national resource reserve held by the Federal government
for the public, which should be made available for

4.
Warren M. Christopher, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act: Key to
a New Frontier, 6 Stan. L. Rev. 23, 23 (Dec. 1953).
5.
Pres. Procl. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (Sept. 28, 1945).
6.
See Part II, infra, and accompanying notes.
7.
2004 USCOP Report, supra n. 1, at 364-68.
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expeditious and orderly development, subject to
environmental safeguards....” 43 U.S.C. § 1332. In 1996,
the United States received over $3.5 billion in leasing and
royalty revenue from oil and gas and other minerals from
8
these offshore public lands.
Congress and the Supreme Court have largely resolved the basic
issues of which government—the relevant coastal state or the federal
government—has jurisdiction to regulate offshore activities in specific
locations. Nevertheless, the status of the federally-controlled portions of
the continental shelf (generally referred to as the Outer Continental Shelf,
or OCS) remains variable. The federal OCS includes the submerged lands
subject to U.S. control more than three miles out to sea in most places, or
9
three marine leagues off the Gulf of Mexico coasts of Texas and Florida.
This Article examines the contextualized status of the continental
shelf as “public lands” and potential import of that status from a historical
perspective. It begins in Part I with a quick examination of what the
federal public lands are and why “public lands” status matters. Part II then
examines the two significant controversies that arose with respect to the
continental shelf beginning in the 1930s and continuing until Congress
10
enacted both the Submerged Lands Act and the Outer Continental Shelf
11
Lands Act in 1953. The first issue was who owned and/or controlled the
first three miles of ocean—the states or the federal government?
Assuming that the federal government had some authority over at least
some parts of the continental shelf, the second issue was whether the
federal government had authority, pursuant to its terrestrial public lands
mineral statutes, to lease areas of the continental shelf for oil and gas
development.
Parts III and IV then turn to Congress’s responses to this
litigation. Part III examines the legislative history of both the Submerged
Lands Act and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act for evidence of how
Congress was thinking about the continental shelf, especially the OCS, in
relation to other mineral- and energy-producing federal public lands. Part
IV, in turn, examines OCS-relevant federal law since 1953, in statutes as

8.
Bob Armstrong, Our Federal Public Lands, 12 Nat. Resources & Env.
3, 4 (Summer 1997).
9.
2004 USCOP Report, supra n. 1, at 70-71.
10.
43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (2006).
11.
Id. at §§ 1331-1356a.
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12

diverse as the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971, the Federal
13
Lands Policy Management Act of 1976, the Abandoned Shipwreck Act
14
of 1987, and the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. The Article
concludes that the continental shelf’s—and even just the OCS’s—legal
status as public lands depends significantly on the exact context and the
exact legal question that is being asked. In the context of offshore oil and
gas exploration and development, however, the OCS should be viewed as
public lands, even though Congress has made no provision for conveying
title to those lands into private ownership.
II. THE IMPORT OF “PUBLIC LANDS” STATUS
The status of any submerged lands, and especially the OCS, as
federal public lands is not particularly intuitive. Nor has the subject been
the focus of extensive general litigation. There are several good reasons
for this gap. First, under the federal Equal Footing Doctrine and principles
of state title, states took title to the submerged beds and banks of
navigable fresh waters and all tidally influenced coastal waters as they
15
became states. As a result, these two very important sets of submerged
16
lands are not federal lands —although they may constitute, under the
17
Second, the submerged
relevant state’s land, public lands of the state.
lands beneath non-navigable fresh waters generally belong to the private
18
riparian landowners adjacent to the water body.
As a result, these
12.
Id. at §§ 1601-1629h (2006).
13.
Id. at §§ 1701-1782 (2006).
14.
Id. at §§ 2101-2106 (2006).
15.
PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1227-28 (2012)
(citations omitted).
16.
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has occasionally described these
submerged lands as “pre-reserved” to the states and hence as subject to the rule that
federal public lands do not include lands reserved for a specific purpose. See Scott v.
Carew, 196 U.S. 100, 111-12 (1905) (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 38 (1894);
Mann v. Tacoma Land Co., 153 U.S. 273 (1894)).
17.
See e.g., Fish House, Inc. v. Clarke, 693 S.E.2d 208, 212-13 (N.C. App.
2010) (including navigable waters as state public lands); Walton County v. Stop the
Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So.2d 1102, 1109-13 (Fla. 2008) (describing in detail
the nature of the coastal public lands below the mean high water line). But see
Totemoff v. State, 905 P.2d 954, 962-68 (Alaska 1995) (holding that, in general,
navigable waters and the lands under them are not public lands).
18.
See e.g. Mesenbrink v. Hosterman, 210 P.2d 515, 519-20 (Idaho 2009)
(describing the devolution of title to the submerged lands of nonnavigable water
bodies from the federal government to private riparian landowners); Orr v. Mortvedt,
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submerged lands are usually not in any kind of public ownership,
obviating the public lands issue. Finally, the offshore continental shelf,
and especially the OCS, did not become significantly important
economically—and hence legally—until the mid-1930s, with increasing
19
importance after World War II. As a result, many of the 19th- and 20thcentury court decisions, federal statutes, and Executive Branch actions
regarding federal public lands simply did not consider the submerged
lands beneath the oceans.
Complicating the issue even further is the fact that “public lands”
has different meanings in different contexts. For example, as a matter of
federal common law, as George Coggins and Robert Glicksman have
emphasized, “[t]he meaning of the term ‘public lands’ has varied greatly .
. . . In common parlance, the term simply means all lands owned by the
20
United States.” To the extent that the federal courts settled on a specific
common-law definition, however, they indicated that federal public lands
are federally owned lands that are available—albeit often through federal
regulation—for general public use and for acquisition of private property
rights. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court has emphasized that federal
public lands cannot include lands reserved by Congress or the Executive
21
for specific purposes, such as tribal reservations or national parks.
Instead, it has suggested that federal public lands must be “unqualifiedly
22
subject to sale and disposition” or “subject to sale or other disposal
23
under general laws.”
Traditionally, this definition has also delineated the import of
“public lands” status. Unlike other kinds of federal lands, such as reserved
lands, federal agencies could readily give private citizens (or, in some
cases, the states) some interest—title or “other disposal”—in the federal
735 N.W.2d 610, 616 (Iowa 2007) (“The navigable or nonnavigable status of a
watercourse generally determines whether the bed of a watercourse is owned by the
state or by private parties.”).
19.
United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 37-39 (1947).
20.
George Cameron Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, Public Natural
Resources Law vol. 1, § 1.13 (2d ed., West 2012).
21.
Federal Power Commission v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 448 (1955)
(holding that the Warm Springs Indian Reservation and other reserved federal lands
are not “public lands”); United States v. O’Donnell, 303 U.S. 501, 510 (1938); United
States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 206 (1926); Scott v. Carew, 196 U.S. 100, 111-12
(1905); Missouri, Kansas & Topeka Ry. Co. v. Roberts, 152 U.S. 114, 118-19 (1894);
Wilcox v. Jackson ex dem. McConnel, 38 U.S. 498, 513 (1839).
22.
O’Donnell, 303 U.S. at 510.
23.
Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U.S. 761, 763 (1875).
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public lands. Such interests, historically, have ranged from title patents in
24
25
26
Viewed
formerly federal lands to timber sales to mineral leases.
from this perspective, offshore submerged lands, and especially the OCS,
should qualify as at least a form of federal public lands, especially in light
of Coggins’ and Glicksman’s recognition that the evolution of the law
governing federal lands has rendered “the common law definitions [of
27
‘public lands’] obsolete.”
Instead, the status of the OCS is best
evaluated through the rich history and thick lens of the statutes that now
govern its use and management. That history, as Part II will explore,
begins with the rather sudden desire in the 1920s through 1940s to develop
the energy resources that lay buried off the United States’ coasts,
especially in the Gulf of Mexico and off California.
III. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CONTINENTAL
SHELF CONTROVERSIES
Immediately before and especially after World War II, all facets of
U.S. society viewed development of the United States’ offshore
petroleum, and to a lesser extent natural gas, resources as being critical to
28
both our national security and our economic well-being.
The oil
business was also, of course, incredibly lucrative. Beginning in the mid1930s in particular, this new interest in offshore oil and gas drove two
significant legal controversies, one pitting coastal states against the federal
government for control over continental shelf energy development and one
questioning the federal government’s actual authority under existing
public lands statutes to regulate offshore oil and gas development. Both of
these controversies helped to shape the status of offshore submerged lands
as “public lands.”

24.
The federal government has issued land patents under a variety of
federal statutes. These include: Coal Lands Act of 1909, 30 U.S.C. § 81 (2006); Coal
Lands Act of 1910, 30 U.S.C. §§ 83-85 (2006); Homestead Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 325-329
(2006); Indian Homestead Act, 43 U.S.C. § 190 (2006); Mineral Lands Act, 30 U.S.C.
§ 22 (2006); Stock Raising Homestead Act, 43 U.S.C. § 299 (2006); and Swamp
Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 982-984 (2006), among others.
25.
16 U.S.C. § 472a (2006).
26.
Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-195 (2006); Materials
Act of 1947, 30 U.S.C. § 611 (2006).
27.
Coggins & Glicksman, supra n. 18, at § 1.13.
28.
See discussions infra.
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A. Jurisdiction over the First Three Miles of Ocean, Including Its
Submerged Lands
Beginning in the 1930s, the revenues to be made from the leasing
of offshore lands for oil development sparked a series of long and bitter
legal battles between coastal states—notably, California, Louisiana,
29
Florida, and Texas —and the federal government for control over
offshore oil and gas development. Many of these controversies were
sparked around 1937, when oil prospectors and their attorneys applied to
the U.S. Department of the Interior for permission to explore for and
develop offshore oil and gas resources under the federal Mineral Leasing
Act, insisting that the federal government, not states, had the legal
authority to regulate oil and gas prospecting, even in the first three miles
30
of ocean.
As a legal matter, reasonable minds differed over which
31
government owned and/or controlled the first three miles of ocean. As a
practical matter, however, those who emphasized the federal government’s
pervasive laissez-faire attitude toward the oceans—except where its
interests in national security, national defense, international relations, or
national commerce were directly concerned, which was a relatively rare
event during the 19th-century United States’ overall isolationist approach
32
to the world—probably had the better of the argument.
Coastal states
29.
See generally, e.g., United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950)
(holding that the United States controlled oil deposits off the coast of Texas); United
States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950) (holding that the United States controlled oil
deposits off the coast of Louisiana).
30.
See discussion infra Part II.B.
31.
See supra note 29 and the cases cited therein.
32.
As the House of Representatives emphasized, for example:
Many attorneys general have approved, over a period of 100 years,
as required by law, the title to the submerged coastal lands granted
to the United States by the States. The War and Navy Departments
have treated these lands as owned by the States since the
Departments originated most of the requests for State grants of
such lands to the United States. In some 30 opinions, from 1900 to
1937, the Department of the Interior ruled that ownership of the
soil in the 3-mile belt was in the respective States.
H.R. Rpt. 83-215 (March 27, 1953) (reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1385, 1427). See
also id. at 1428 (quoting from these opinions). Moreover, “[a]s late as 1933, the then
Secretary of the Interior, Harold L. Ickes, in refusing to grant a Federal oil ease on
lands under the Pacific Ocean within the boundaries of California, recognized: ’Title
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had exercised fairly plenary authority in regulating offshore coastal
activities such as fishing, sand and gravel mining, and, as oil and gas
became increasingly important, offshore oil and gas leasing, with little to
no interference from the federal government until the 1930s. Moreover,
the formal federal law descriptions of many coastal states’ boundaries,
especially on the Pacific coast and along the Gulf of Mexico, seemed to
confirm state jurisdiction over a band of coastal waters and the
33
corresponding continental shelf.
Nevertheless, the battle over which government controlled the
continental shelf was hard fought in all three branches of the federal
government. In general, the majority of Congress sided with the states,
while the Executive, especially under President Truman, strongly asserted
the federal government’s rights, aided by minority support in Congress.
Thus, for example, “[i]n 1938 and 1939 the Congress failed to enact
legislation asserting ownership of submerged lands in the Federal
Government, and in 1946 the Congress confirmed States’ ownership of
such lands by enactment of House Joint Resolution 225, which was vetoed
34
by President Truman.”
It was the U.S. Supreme Court, however, that gave the first
decisive answer to the question of which government controlled the ocean.
to the soil under the ocean within the 3-mile limit is in the State of California, and the
land may not be appropriated except by authority of the State.’” Id. at 1417.
33.
As the House of Representatives summarized in 1953:
In 1850 Congress approved the constitutional boundaries of
California upon its admission to the Union. Its boundaries were
specifically described as extending 3 miles into the Pacific Ocean.
In 1859 Congress admitted Oregon into the Union with its
constitutional boundaries specifically defined as being 1 marine
league from its coast line. In 1868 Congress approved the
Constitution of Florida, in which its boundaries were defined as
extending 3 marine leagues seaward and a like distance into the
Gulf of Mexico. Texas’ boundary was fixed 3 marine leagues into
the Gulf of Mexico at the time it was admitted to the Union in 1845
by the annexation agreement. In 1889 Congress approved the
Constitution of the State of Washington, which defined its
boundary as extending 1 marine league into the ocean and which
specifically asserted its ownership to the beds of all navigable
waters within the territorial jurisdiction of the State.
Id. at 1428.
34.

Id.

60

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW
35

Vol. 34

On June 23, 1947, in United States v. California, it found in favor of the
36
federal government.
Like all of the litigation between states and the federal government
that raised this issue, United States v. California was a fight over which
sovereign was entitled to the revenues from oil and gas leasing and
37
production in the first three miles of the ocean.
The United States
38
claimed title to the submerged lands of this zone in fee simple. Against
California’s assertions of ownership and control over these submerged
lands based on California’s congressionally ratified constitution and the
39
Equal Footing Doctrine, the Supreme Court emphasized the federal
government’s role both in defending the entire nation and in negotiating
40
international relations with the rest of the world.
It then framed the
issue for resolution as not being about legal title but rather “whether the
state or the Federal Government has the paramount right and power to
determine in the first instance when, how, and by what agencies, foreign
or domestic, the oil and other resources of the soil of the marginal sea,
41
known or hereafter discovered may be exploited.”
The Court rested its decision in the federal government’s favor on
four major grounds.
First, “[a]t the time this country won its
independence from England there was no settled international custom or
understanding among nations that each nation owned a three-mile water
42
belt along its borders.” As a result, the original 13 colonies-cum-states
did not inherit a three-mile zone of ocean from England, giving California
43
no claim to such a zone under the Equal Footing Doctrine. Instead, the
federal government established the nation’s claims to this three-mile zone
44
significantly later in the nation’s history.
Second, “[n]ot only has acquisition, as it were, of the three-mile
belt, been accomplished by the national Government, but protection and
45
control of it has been and is a function of national external sovereignty.”
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

332 U.S. 19 (1947).
Id. at 40-41.
Id. at 22-23.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 29.
California, 332 U.S. at 29.
Id. at 32.
Id.
Id. at 33-34.
Id. at 34.
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Control over this belt of ocean, the Court concluded, was subject to the
46
As a result,
traditional international law rule of freedom of the seas.
national control could be secured only through international negotiation
and perhaps treaty, actions that were clearly the federal government’s
47
prerogative. Indeed, the Court pointed out, “[t]he very oil about which
the state and nation here contend might well become the subject of
48
international dispute and settlement.”
Third, the Supreme Court determined that its prior case law
governing the ownership of submerged lands beneath the internal
navigable waters, under which title usually goes to the states, did not apply
49
at sea.
According to the Court, none of these prior cases squarely
decided the issue of which government controls the first three miles of
ocean, which had become an issue only with the recent advent of offshore
50
oil and gas development.
Finally, California had argued that, even if the federal government
originally had title to the first three miles of continental shelf, that
government had lost title to California as a result of prescription, federal
51
acquiescence, estoppel, laches, and/or res judicata.
In fact, the Court
concluded, neither California nor the federal government had shown much
52
interest in the three-mile belt until recently, when oil became important.
In any case, California could not assert equitable doctrines against the
United States, “which holds its interests here as elsewhere in trust for all
the people [and] is not to be deprived of those interests by the ordinary
court rules designed particularly for private disputes over individually
53
owned pieces of property . . . .”
Thus, the federal government won the case. The Supreme Court
concluded that “we decide for the reasons we have stated that California is
not the owner of the three-mile marginal belt along its coast, and that the
Federal Government rather than the state has paramount rights in and
power over that belt, an incident to which is full dominion over the
54
resources of the soil under that water area, including oil.” However, as
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 34-35.
California, 332 U.S. at 35.
Id.
Id. at 36-39.
Id. at 37-39.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 39.
California, 332 U.S. at 40.
Id. at 38-39.
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this statement indicates, the Court did not clearly settle legal title to the
continental shelf in the United States. Instead, it emphasized only that
“national rights are paramount in waters lying to the seaward in the three55
mile belt” and that “the nation has paramount rights in and power over
56
this ocean belt . . . .”
Nevertheless, at the very end of United States v. California, the
Supreme Court did appear to acknowledge that the continental shelf was
federal property. Specifically, it noted, against California’s fears of
complete exclusion from continental shelf resources, that it would not
“assume that Congress, which has constitutional control over Government
property, will execute its powers in such way as to bring about injustices
to states, their subdivisions, or persons acting pursuant to their
57
permission.”
As a result, while United States v. California left the federal
government with clear authority and jurisdiction to regulate oil and gas
development in all of the United States’ continental shelf, the exact status
of those submerged lands was ambiguous. Litigation over the federal
government’s leasing authority, if anything, only underscored that
ambiguity, leaving much resolution to Congress.
B. Federal Authority Under Federal Public Land Laws to Lease Offshore
Submerged Lands for Oil and Gas Development

The issue of who had title to the continental shelf and control over
offshore oil and gas deposits was important beginning in the 1930s
because Congress had already enacted statutes that appeared to regulate
offshore oil and gas development—if the continental shelf constituted
federal public lands. In particular, the federal Mineral Leasing Act of

55.
Id. at 36.
56.
Id. at 40. See also Submerged Lands Act a Valid Exercise of
Congressional Power, 102 U. Pa. L. Rev. 804, 808 (April 1954) (concluding that the
Supreme Court in later litigation “would have performed a service if it had clearly
defined the rights and relationship of both state and federal governments in the areas
included in the [Submerged Lands] Act. The uncertainties remaining due to the
summary nature of the opinion are an invitation to litigation, or even attempts at new
legislation, which might act to delay and impede the exploitation of resources vital to
the economy and defense of the nation.”).
57.
California, 332 U.S. at 40. (emphasis added).
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1920
for:

63

governs disposition of mineral rights by the federal government

Deposits of coal, phosphate, sodium, potassium, oil, oil
shale, gilsonite (including all vein-type solid
hydrocarbons), or gas, and lands containing such deposits
owned by the United States, including those in national
forests, but excluding lands acquired under the
Appalachian Forest Act, approved March 1, 1911 (36
Stat. 961), and those in incorporated cities, towns, and
villages and in national parks and monuments, those
acquired under other Acts subsequent to February 25,
1920, and lands within the naval petroleum and oil-shale
59
reserves . . . .
Therefore, if the federal government owned the nation’s offshore oil and
gas deposits, the Act would seem to apply.
Individuals seeking to prospect for offshore oil certainly believed
that this statute governed and repeatedly applied to the U.S. Department of
the Interior for the requisite permits and leases. For example, in 1937
Robert E. Lee Jones applied to the Department of the Interior, through its
Los Angeles Land Office, for oil and gas leases off the coast of
60
California. The Department denied his application on the grounds that it
lacked jurisdiction over those offshore tracts, and, after appealing to the
Secretary of the Interior, Jordan sued in the U.S. District Court for the
61
District of Columbia to compel the Department to issue the leases. The
district court ducked the merits of the case, noting the ongoing litigation
over which government controlled the continental shelf but concluding
that, regardless, it lacked authority to compel the Secretary of the Interior
62
to engage in so discretionary an action as issuing mineral leases.
Similarly, in 1934 Deryl L. Mayhew applied to the Department for
a permit to prospect for oil on approximately 1,600 acres of submerged
63
lands off the coast of California.
Again, the Secretary of the Interior
58.
59.
60.
1943).
61.
62.
63.

30 U.S.C. §§ 181-195 (2006).
Id. at § 181.
United States ex rel. Jordan v. Ickes, 55 F. Supp. 875, 875 (D.D.C.
Id.
Id. at 875-76.
Mayhew v. Krug, 98 F. Supp. 338, 338 (D.D.C. 1951).

64
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denied the permit on the grounds that California, not the United States,
64
Despite the fact that it was deciding the
controlled the lands at issue.
case in 1951, four years after the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. California, the D.C. District Court held the case in abeyance in
light of the Supreme Court’s decision to retain jurisdiction over United
65
States v. California to resolve further issues. However, it also noted that
the Secretary of the Interior, on behalf of the United States, was arguing in
defense that the Mineral Leasing Act “does not apply to land lying beneath
66
the marginal sea because such is not public land.”
Indeed, even after United States v. California, the U.S. Department
of the Interior continued to reject applications for leases under the Mineral
Lands Leasing Act for offshore submerged lands. The legal basis of these
rejections was the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior’s August
1947 opinion that the continental shelf was not “public lands” and hence
that the Mineral Leasing Act did not apply to offshore oil and gas
67
development. For example, in 1939, Alma Swart applied under the Act
for a lease of 640 acres of submerged lands off the coast of southern
California from which the City of Long Beach, pursuant to California law,
was already pumping oil under a trust relationship with the state; Earl
68
Sinclair and Lauren Cherry applied for an adjacent 640-acre tract.
Despite United States v. California, the Secretary of the Interior denied the
69
applications in 1948.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit upheld the
70
Department of the Interior’s interpretation in Justheim v. McKay
in
1956—notably, after Congress enacted the Submerged Lands Act and
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act in 1953, as discussed in the next part.
Plaintiffs in the case were numerous persons who had applied to the
Department of the Interior for oil and gas leases for submerged lands off
the coast of California, within the three-mile belt, all of which applications

64.
Id. at 338-39.
65.
Id. at 340.
66.
Id.
67.
Justheim v. McKay, 123 F. Supp. 560, 561 (D.D.C. 1954) (citing
Opinion No. M-34985, Solicitor of the Department of the Interior (Aug. 8, 1947)).
68.
Gabrielson v. City of Long Beach, 56 Cal.2d 224, 230, 363 P.2d 883,
887 (Cal. 1961).
69.
Id.
70.
229 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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When the plaintiffs
the Secretary of the Interior had denied in 1948.
sued the Secretary in federal court, “[t]he District Court concluded that the
Mineral Lands Leasing Act applied only to public lands and that public
72
lands do not include lands beneath the marginal seas.” The D.C. Circuit
adopted the district court’s reasoning almost without comment and
73
affirmed.
The district court emphasized the Solicitor for the Department of
the Interior’s opinion “that the Mineral Leasing Act did not authorize the
issuance of oil and gas leases on submerged coastal areas below low tide
74
off the shores of the United States.” As the district court recounted,
The opinion of the Solicitor was based on the following
grounds (1) the Mineral Leasing Act is a statute for the
disposition of public lands, but lands located below the
high water mark, are not now and never have been
considered public lands of the United States, (2) lands
affected by the Act are to be surveyed and described by
legal subdivisions of the public land surveys and these
surveys have not heretofore extended beyond the high tide
line, (3) since there had been no judicial determination
that these lands belonged to the United States at the time
of passage of the Act nor at the time of the amendatory
Act of August 8, 1946, it could not be assumed that
Congress intended to subject these lands to the provisions
75
of the Act.
The public lands argument turned first on what Congress meant by
“public domain” in the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, and the district court
76
concluded that the term meant “public lands.”
The district court then
noted that:
Public lands have been generally defined as those lands of
the United States which are subject to sale or other
71.
Id. at 29-30.
72.
Id. at 30.
73.
Id. at 30-31.
74.
Justheim, 123 F. Supp. at 561-62 (citing Opinion No. M-34985,
Solicitor of the Department of the Interior (Aug. 8, 1947)).
75.
Id. at 561-62.
76.
Id. at 562 (citing Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481, 490 (1901)).
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disposal under general laws. Not all lands of the United
States are classified as public lands. Lands to which
rights have attached and become vested through full
compliance with an applicable land law are no longer part
of the mass of public lands, nor are lands which have been
reserved or appropriated for some lawful public purpose,
77
i.e., National Parks, Military and naval reservation, etc.
To support this traditional view of the public laws, the district court traced
the history of federal mining laws and bills that existed before 1920,
emphasizing that “[t]here are found in the legislative histories of all these
bills expressions that the bills are intended to apply to minerals located in
public lands or those minerals reserved when the public lands were
78
patented to individuals.” Similarly, during the consideration of the bill
that became the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, “there were several
statements which reflect the fact that Congress intended it to apply only to
the public land minerals. In the House Report on the bill it was made
79
unmistakably clear that this was the intention of the bill.” Absent from
the district court’s consideration was the fact that Congress had no real
reason to think about the continental shelf in these discussions; instead, the
federal public lands would continue to be what the federal public lands
always had been: terrestrial.
Finally, relying to a great degree on the battle between the federal
government and the state governments over title to and control over the
continental shelf in the first three miles of ocean, the court concluded that
these submerged lands could not be public lands:
Although there had been no judicial determination of this
question, it appears that these lands were never considered
public lands of the United States. As defined above
public lands are those lands of the United States which are
subject to sale or other disposal under general laws. The
areas involved in this action were never held open for sale
77.
Id. at 562-63 (citing Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U.S. 761, 763 (1875);
Bardon v. Northern Pacific R.R. Co., 145 U.S. 535, 538 (1892); Payne v. Central
Pacific Ry. Co., 255 U.S. 228, 237 (1921); Leavenworth, Lawrence & Galveston R.R.
Co. v. United States, 92 U.S. 733, 745 (1875); United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S.
181, 206 (1926); Scott v. Carew, 196 U.S. 100, 114 (1905)).
78.
Id. at 564.
79.
Id.
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or other disposal. Furthermore, the public land surveys
were never extended beyond the high tide line and it has
been held that unsurveyed lands are not public lands of
the United States. Rather than being considered public
lands of the United States it appears that for many years
these areas were believed to be the property of the
adjacent state. This belief resulted from a series of cases
which raised questions as to whether lands covered by
inland waters and tidelands were public lands. In holding
that tidelands were not public lands, the Court used such
strong language that it was believed all submerged lands
within the territorial jurisdiction of a State were State
property, regardless of whether they were tidelands, lands
80
covered by inland waters or marginal sea lands.
In other words, the continental shelf could not be federal public
lands because everyone had always believed that it belonged to the states.
While United States v. California “established the interest of the Federal
Government in these lands,” it “did not hold that they were subject to lease
81
under the Mineral Leasing Act.”
(Of course, the Mineral Leasing Act
issue was not before the Court.) The district court also emphasized that
the Supreme Court had not clearly established the federal government as
the owner in fee of the offshore submerged lands, underscoring the point
82
that these lands could not be public lands. Finally, “[a]lthough Congress
had on several occasions extended the applicability of the Mineral Leasing
Act to lands which were not within the scope of the original act, it has not
taken any action specifically to include submerged coastal lands within the
83
provisions of the act.”
In the wake of United States v. California, therefore, the judiciary
and the Executive were in agreement that the United States’ newly
acquired coastal submerged lands were not “public lands,” especially not
with regard to the Mineral Leasing Act. However, as the district court in
Justheim acknowledged, Congress can add territory to the federal public
lands; to hold otherwise would be to limit forever the federal public lands
to the territory that the United States owned at some particular point in
80.
81.
82.
83.

Justheim, 123 F. Supp. at 565.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 567.
Id. at 568.
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history. Moreover, the continental shelf of the United States could (and
arguably still can) properly be considered a new territorial acquisition:
President Truman’s Proclamation extended the United States’ claim to its
84
continental shelf under the high seas in 1945; the Supreme Court
decided United States v. California in 1947; and the international law
governing coastal jurisdiction continued to evolve through the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which recognized
coastal nations’ claims to at least 200 miles of continental shelf as a matter
85
of treaty, and which the United States (a non-party) claims represents
86
customary international law.
As a result, the district court’s and D.C. Circuit’s decisions in
Justheim and the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior’s 1947
opinion on the Mineral Leasing Act are best viewed as temporal rather
than absolute judgments regarding the continental shelf’s status as federal
public lands, particularly with regard to the OCS more than three miles out
to sea—that is, that these were opinions that offshore submerged lands
were not federal public lands yet. Therefore, the continental shelf’s status
must be evaluated in light of the legislation that Congress enacted in 1953
in response to United States v. California and the Mineral Lands Leasing
Act litigation. It is to those statutes that this Article now turns.
IV. THE PASSAGE OF THE SUBMERGED LANDS ACT AND THE
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS ACT
While the federal courts provided the first round of resolutions to
both the jurisdictional and the federal leasing authority questions for the
continental shelf, Congress soon responded with two pieces of legislation
intended to “fix” those judicial conclusions. It passed both statutes—the
Submerged Lands Act and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act—in
1953, and the legislative history supporting their enactment provides
interesting historical insights into Congress’ view of the continental shelf
as public lands.

84.
Pres. Procl. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (Sept. 28, 1945).
85.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 76-85 (Dec. 10,
1982) 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
86.
E.g. Pub. L. No. 104-43, § 401(1), 109 Stat. 389 (Aug. 27, 1954)
(characterizing the prior U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea as incorporating the
customary international law right of passage); National Policy for the Oceans, Our
Coasts, and the Great Lakes, 74 Fed. Reg. 28591-28592 (June 12, 2009).
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A. The Submerged Lands Act of 1953
In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in United States
87
88
v. California, Congress decided to “correct” the Court’s holding by
89
“returning” the first three miles of ocean submerged lands to the coastal
90
states.
It accomplished this goal through the Submerged Lands Act of
91
As enacted, the Submerged Lands Act declares the national
1953.
interest:
that (1) title to and ownership of the lands beneath
navigable waters within the boundaries of the respective
States, and the natural resources within such lands and
waters, and (2) the right and power to manage, administer,
lease, develop, and use the said lands and natural
resources all in accordance with applicable State law be,
and they are, subject to the provisions hereof, recognized,

87.
332 U.S. 19 (1947).
88.
See H.R. Rpt. 83-215 (March 27, 1953) (reprinted in 1953
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1385, 1419-25) (questioning the wisdom of the Supreme Court’s
decision and describing all of the problems that it created as justifying congressional
legislation).
89.
See id. at 1417-19 (emphasizing that “[t]hroughout our Nation’s history
the States have been in possession of and exercising all the rights and attributes of
ownership in the lands and resources beneath the navigable waters within their
boundaries,” cataloging Congress’s attempts to preserve this ownership against the
Executive Branch, and characterizing the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
California as “establish[ing] the law differently from what eminent jurists, lawyers,
and public officials for more than a century had believed it to be, but also differently
from what the Supreme Court apparently had believed it to be.”).
90.
See id. at 1385 (noting that the purpose of the legislation was to “to
confirm and establish the titles of the States to lands beneath navigable waters within
State boundaries and to the natural resources within such lands and waters, and to
provide for the use and control of said lands and resources and the resources of the
outer Continental Shelf”); see also id. at 1388-89 (summarizing Title II of the
proposed legislation as “declar[ing] that it is in the public interest that title and
ownership of lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of the respective
States and of the natural resources therein be in the respective States. It provides in
addition to but also distinct from title and ownership that the rights and power to
administer, lease, control, develop, and use such lands and resources under applicable
State laws and in accordance with the terms of the bill.”)
91.
Pub. L. No. 83-31, 67 Stat. 29 (May 22, 1953) (codified at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-1315 (2006)).
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confirmed, established, and vested in and assigned to the
92
respective States . . . .
The Act released all of the federal government’s title and claim to the first
93
three miles of offshore submerged lands, with the exceptions of the
federal government’s authority and right to regulate such waters for
94
navigation, flood control, and power and of the submerged lands to
95
which the federal government had already acquired or reserved title. In
addition, the United States retained:
all its navigational servitude and rights in and powers of
regulation and control of said lands and navigable waters
for the constitutional purposes of commerce, navigation,
national defense, and international affairs, all of which
shall be paramount to, but shall not be deemed to include,
proprietary rights of ownership, or the rights of
management, administration, leasing, use, and
development of the lands and natural resources which are
specifically recognized, confirmed, established, and
vested in and assigned to the respective States and others .
96
...
Because the Submerged Lands Act gave control to the states, it largely
avoided the “public lands” quandary. Instead, the Act works on “lands
beneath navigable waters,” which it defined to be:
(1) all lands within the boundaries of each of the
respective States which are covered by nontidal waters
that were navigable under the laws of the United States at
the time such State became a member of the Union, or
acquired sovereignty over such lands and waters
thereafter, up to the ordinary high water mark as

92.
43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006). For a contemporary history of the
Submerged Lands Act, see generally Aaron L. Shalowitz, Boundary Problems Raised
by the Submerged Lands Act, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 1021 (1954).
93.
Id. at § 1311(b).
94.
Id. at § 1311(d).
95.
Id. at § 1313.
96.
Id. at § 1314(a).
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heretofore or hereafter modified by accretion, erosion, and
reliction;
(2) all lands permanently or periodically covered by tidal
waters up to but not above the line of mean high tide and
seaward to a line three geographical miles distant from the
coast line of each such State and to the boundary line of
each such State where in any case such boundary as it
existed at the time such State became a member of the
Union, or as heretofore approved by Congress, extends
seaward (or into the Gulf of Mexico) beyond three
geographical miles, and
(3) all filled in, made, or reclaimed lands which formerly
97
were lands beneath navigable waters . . . .
After the Submerged Lands Act, therefore, “lands beneath
navigable waters”—including offshore submerged lands out to (for most
98
states ) three miles—thus belong to the coastal states. In contrast, the
United States claimed for itself “the natural resources of that portion of the
subsoil and seabed of the Continental Shelf lying seaward and outside of
99
the area of lands beneath navigable waters,” effectively confirming the
Supreme Court’s United States v. California opinion for the OCS.
While the Submerged Lands Act preserves all rights acquired in
submerged laws pursuant to other laws, it also disclaims that it constitutes
100
or incorporates any interpretation that any other federal laws apply.
In
other words, the Act expressly leaves open the question of whether the
submerged lands of the OCS should be considered “public lands” for other
federal law purposes.
Undoubted, members of Congress sincerely believed that the U.S.
Supreme Court had simply gotten the law wrong and states should be
entitled to control the first three miles of continental shelf and coastal
waters, subject to some specific reservations of federal authority and
97.
Id. at § 1301(a).
98.
43 U.S.C. § 1312 (2006) (allowing states to press more extensive
claims to offshore submerged lands based on historic ownership or control). Only
Florida and Texas succeeded, in the Gulf of Mexico. JOSEPH J. KALO ET AL., COASTAL
AND OCEAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 422 (3rd ed. 2007).
99.
Id. at § 1302.
100.
Id. at § 1315.
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101

Nevertheless, one of the key motivations for the Submerged
title.
Lands Act was to ensure the rapid and steady development of offshore
petroleum by ending much of the litigation. For example, the House of
Representatives’ committee report on the new legislation waxed quite
poetic about the “almost interminable debate over the disposition of these
submerged lands” and the resulting “acute and vital necessity of the
immediate enactment of legislation to promote the exploration and
development of the petroleum deposits known to be located in these
102
areas.”
It further emphasized “[t]he strategic importance of oil to our
economy and our defense efforts,” which “demand immediate action to
103
alleviate a growing menace to our national welfare.”
Continuing
litigation over control of these submerged lands, however, brought
offshore petroleum development to a virtual standstill, particularly in the
104
Gulf of Mexico.
Similarly, the Senate’s report on the legislation
emphasized the great wealth lying beneath the continental shelf and its
105
importance to national defense.
101.
See H.R. Rpt. 83-215, supra n. 86, at 1429-32 (describing the equities
of granting these submerged lands to the states).
102.
Id. at 1386.
103.
Id.
104.
Id. (“Since the court decisions in the cases involving the States of
California, Louisiana, and Texas, new development of the vast potentialities located in
these lands has been brought almost to a complete standstill, particularly in the Gulf of
Mexico. The litigation which was the primary cause of these stoppages threatens to
further retard any progress. Therefore, the committee feels that permanent legislation
covering all phases of this litigation must be enacted.”). See also id. at 1396 (stating,
in an appendix report generated from prior attempts at similar legislation, that “[t]his
controversy, originating in 1938, has been before the Seventy-fifth, Seventy-sixth,
Seventy-ninth, Eightieth, Eighty-first, and Eighty-second Congresses. The longer it
continues, the more vexatious and confused it becomes. Interminable litigation has
arisen between the States and the Federal Government, between applicants for leases
under the Federal Mineral Leasing Act and the Departments of Justice and Interior,
and between the States and their lessees. Much-needed improvements on these lands
and the development of strategic natural resources within them have been seriously
retarded.”); id. at 1397 (describing how litigation that began in 1950 had brought oil
and gas development in the Gulf of Mexico to a “standstill”).
105.
Sen. Rpt. 83-133 (Mar. 27, 1953) (reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1471, 1534) (“Great wealth lies beneath the waters off the shores of our Nation. The
oil supply is the richest of the treasures that have been so far discovered. It is one of
the richest discoveries of natural wealth in the history of the United States. In
addition, vast reserves of natural gas, sulfur, and other resources, some discovered
only recently, bring the total value of the known resources in this rich submerged area
to many billions of dollars. The oil supply alone is one of the keys to the defense of
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Beyond the need to end the conflicts was also the fact that the
states were better positioned at the time to promote offshore petroleum
development. As the House of Representatives explained in its report on
the legislation that became the Submerged Lands Act, “[y]ears have been
spent by the States in working out legislation, rules, and regulations, and
details of procedure and practices governing the geophysical work, leasing
methods and drilling problems involved in this new and hazardous type of
oil exploration. . . . The States have established and maintain
departments, technical staffs, and experienced personnel to handle these
106
matters and supervise these activities.”
In contrast, “[i]f the submerged
lands are transferred from State to Federal control, the Federal
Government will have to begin from scratch. . . . The ownership of the
submerged lands off the coasts of Texas and Louisiana and other coastal
States will have to be determined by litigation. . . . At present there is not
even a law under which the Federal Government could operate these
107
lands.”
As a result, “[t]he committee believes that failure to continue
existing State control will result in delaying for an indefinite time the
intensive development now under way on these lands and that any delay
is, in the words of Secretary Forrestal, ‘contrary to the best interest of the
108
United States from the viewpoint of national security.’” Finally,
No evidence was presented to show that the Federal
Government could do a better job in administering the
submerged lands than the States are doing. The evidence
is overwhelming that State control is not only adequate
but is desirable. Geological, engineering, and physical
conditions in oil production vary greatly not only from
State to State, but also from field to field within a State.
Different practices and procedures have been established
109
to fit the peculiar local needs.

our country and of the entire free world. Planes, tanks, and ships—all of these major
instruments of modern warfare—are useful only if there is enough oil to keep them in
motion.”).
106.
H.R. Rpt. 83-215, supra n. 86, at 1433.
107.
Id.
108.
Id.
109.
Id.
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The House committee report on the Submerged Lands Act
legislation also suggests that the House considered submerged lands—at
least those owned by the federal government—to be public lands. First,
the proposed legislation specifically exempted from transfer to the states
submerged lands that the United States owned as part of the public
110
lands,
indicating that the OCS was both federal and a form of public
lands. Second, part of the House’s defense of giving states control over
the first three miles of offshore submerged lands also evidenced its view
than the OCS constituted public lands just like government-owned
terrestrial lands. Specifically, the House committee looked to evidence
from oil and gas production from these more traditional public lands to
argue that states should be left in control of the offshore submerged lands:
In the five public land States producing oil and gas, the
Federal Government owns approximately 36 1/2 percent
of the acreage but produces only about 13 percent of the
oil and gas produced in these States. The 1946 total
production from these lands was approximately
62,000,000 barrels, while the production from State and
privately owned lands in the same States was in excess of
380,000,000 barrels. Thus, it will be seen that in these
five ‘public land’ States, where Federal- and State-owned
lands are in direct competition with each other,
development has been much faster and production has
been much greater under State regulation than under
Federal control. The total annual production of oil from
the vast federally owned domain in 1946 was less than 12
days’ production of the Nation. It must be conceded that
the Federal Government has made a pitiful showing with
respect to the development of public lands for oil and gas
111
purposes.
Thus, at least as far as energy development was concerned, the House
committee viewed the continental shelf as being equivalent to terrestrial
public lands, whether state- or federal-owned. Moreover, in its opinion,
the return of the first three miles to the states would create both stateowned public lands and federal public lands off the nation’s coasts that
110.
111.

Id. at 1388.
Id. at 1434.
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were capable of mineral development, just as mineral development
occurred on both state and federal terrestrial public lands.

B. The House of Representatives’ Federal Leasing Provisions Intended
for the Submerged Lands Act
In its version of the Submerged Lands Act, the House of
Representatives would have addressed federal offshore oil and gas leasing
more than three miles out to sea (proposed Title III). The Senate
eventually struck these provisions from the legislation that became the
Submerged Lands Act—although such leasing became the core focus of
the companion Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, discussed below.
Nevertheless, the House’s report on these provisions provides some
insight into the status of the Outer Continental Shelf as public lands.
The House bill would have addressed oil and gas leasing because
the House was concerned that failure to assert decisive control over the
OCS would prejudice the United States’ interests and relationships in the
112
international sphere.
Moreover, the House recognized that the parts of
the continental shelf given to states were a relatively small part of the total
continental shelf that the United States had already claimed through
113
President Truman’s 1945 Proclamation : “[t]hat part of the shelf which
lies within historic State boundaries, or 3 miles in most cases, is estimated
to contain about 27,000 square miles or less than 10 percent of the total
114
area of the shelf . . . .”
Notably, therefore, the federal government controlled more than
90 percent of the potentially developable—for oil and gas—continental
shelf off the coast of the United States, the OCS. However, as the House
committee report further noted, “no law now exists whereby the Federal
Government can lease those submerged lands, the development and
115
operation of which are vital to our national economy and security.”
It
was Congress’s duty to act so that all that petroleum could be
116
developed.
States, in contrast, could regulate their offshore submerged
117
lands through their respective police powers.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 1386.
Pres. Procl. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (Sept. 28, 1945).
H.R. Rpt. 83-215, supra n. 86, at 1390.
Id. at 1391.
Id.
Id. at 1391, 1406-07.
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One of the telling aspects of the House’s proposed legislation, at
least so far as the status of the offshore submerged lands as federal public
lands is concerned, is that the House from the beginning lodged authority
118
for offshore oil and gas leasing with the Secretary of the Interior.
As
was discussed in Part II, much of the litigation that precipitated the need
for the Submerged Lands Act and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
arose from private parties trying to lease offshore submerged lands for
mineral development pursuant to the federal Mineral Leasing Act, which
is also administered by the Department of the Interior. The Department of
the Interior was deemed the de facto regulatory authority for offshore oil
and gas development, despite the paucity of explicit legal authority to
engage in such leasing, on the basis of its authority to allow mineral
development on the terrestrial federal public lands. Indeed, in its
proposals, the House would have made nine sections of the federal
119
Mineral Leasing Act directly applicable to the continental shelf.
It also
turned to that Act for precedent on how to divide royalties from mineral
120
development on the continental shelf with states.
In describing earlier bills on the same subject, the House equated
the continental shelf to new territory acquired under international law
doctrines of discovery or conquest. The House’s proposed legislation
would have brought “the lands and resources within such areas into the
same legal status as those acquired by the United States through cession or
annexation; in the alternative, such lands and resources are subject to the
121
doctrine of discovery.”
Building on this Article’s suggestion at the end
of Part II, the House thus arguably viewed the OCS as new federal public
lands that had to be incorporated into existing public land law.

C. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA)
Despite the House of Representatives’ impulse to address both
continental shelf jurisdiction and OCS oil and gas leasing, exploration, and
development in one statute, Congress as a whole chose to address the
latter activities separately, about three months after it enacted the
Submerged Lands Act, in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act

118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 1391-93.
Id. at 1404.
H.R. Rpt. 83-215 at 1413-14.
Id. at 1407.
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122

The OCSLA also made clear that the OCS is under U.S.
(“OCSLA”).
jurisdiction and that federal and, to some extent, state laws apply to oil and
123
gas operations on those submerged lands.
The OCSLA is very much a companion statute to the Submerged
Lands Act. For example, the OCSLA defines the “outer continental shelf”
to which it applies by reference to the Submerged Lands Act. The “outer
continental shelf” is “all submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the
area of lands beneath navigable waters as defined in section 1301 of this
title [the Submerged Lands Act], and of which the subsoil and seabed
appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction and
124
control.”
The OCSLA also borrows heavily from federal public lands
statutes governing terrestrial mineral and energy development, suggesting
strongly that Congress viewed the Outer Continental Shelf as a form of
federal public lands, at least so far as developing these resources was
concerned. For example, the OCSLA defines the “minerals” to which it
applies with reference to the federal public land statutes. In OCSLA’s
current form, “minerals” means “oil, gas, sulphur, geopressuredgeothermal and associated resources, and all other minerals which are
authorized by an Act of Congress to be produced from ‘public lands’ as
125
defined in section 1702 of this title.”
This cross-reference to federal
public land law explicitly excludes the OCS from federal public lands
126
managed by the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”),
creating a
perfect parallelism of regulatory regimes for federal lands: the OCSLA
governs the OCS while other statutes govern federal terrestrial lands, but
the regimes are otherwise parallel regulatory schemes for assigning
mineral interests in federal lands.
That parallelism is more evident in the original OCSLA than is
evident in the amended version today. As originally enacted, the OCSLA
made clear that it was a mineral leasing statute and that it was superseding
similar statutes for terrestrial public lands. The OCSLA originally focused
122.
Act of August 7, 1953, ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462 (Aug. 7, 1953) (codified at
43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356a (2006)). For a contemporary account of the OCSLA’s
passage and import, see generally Christopher, supra n. 4.
123.
43 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006).
124.
Id. at § 1331(a).
125.
Id. at § 1331(q). The cross-reference now references the definition of
Bureau of Lands Management (“BLM”) public lands in the Federal Lands
Management & Policy Act (“FLPMA”), discussed in more detail in Part IV, infra. See
43 U.S.C. § 1702(a) (2006) (defining “public lands”).
126.
Id. at § 1702(a).
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on “mineral leases,” which it defined to be “any form of authorization for
the exploration for, or development or removal of deposits of, oil, gas, or
127
Similarly, Congress extended the federal
other minerals . . . .”
Constitution and federal statutes to the Outer Continental Shelf “to the
same extent as if the outer Continental Shelf were an area of exclusive
Federal jurisdiction located within a State: Provided, however, That
mineral leases on the outer Continental Shelf shall be maintained or issued
128
only under the provisions of this Act.”
As Warren Christopher noted in
a contemporaneous article on the Act, “[t]he provision that federal laws
apply to the outer Shelf as if it were ‘an area of exclusive Federal
jurisdiction located within a state’ solved the drafting problem in
connection with federal laws which might be interpreted as being limited
129
in their application to continental United States.”
The OCS, therefore, was just like terrestrial federal public lands,
except that the OCSLA governed mineral leasing there. Notably, the
OCSLA is and has been codified into Title 43 of the United States Code,
which is entitled “Public Lands.” In addition, Congress’ declaration of
policies in amendments to the OCSLA confirm that Congress thought of
the OCS as public lands. In the OCSLA, Congress established a U.S.
policy that “the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf
appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control,
130
and power of disposition as provided in” the Act.
Moreover, “the outer
Continental Shelf is a vital national resource reserve held by the Federal
Government for the public, which should be made available for
expeditious and orderly development, subject to environmental
safeguards, in a manner which is consistent with the maintenance of
131
competition and other national needs . . . .”
Congress also has
emphasized that the purpose of the OCSLA was to provide a method for
132
distributing OCS lands for development—albeit by leases, not by deed.
127.
Pub. L. No. 83-212, § 2(c), 67 Stat. 462, 462 (Aug. 7, 1953).
128.
Id. at § 4(a)(1), 67 Stat. at 462.
129.
Christopher, supra n. 4, at 42.
130.
43 U.S.C. §§ 1332(1) (2006).
131.
Id. at § 1332(3).
132.
See id. §§ 1334 (putting the Secretary of the Interior in charge of the
leasing regime and regulations for it and specifying when leases can be cancelled);
1335 (providing for validation of leases that existed before the OCSLA’s enactment,
especially leases procured under state law); 1337 (describing the bidding system);
1338 (designating how revenues should be disposed of); 1340 (describing exploration
plan requirements); 1344 (outlining the federal leasing program).
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Moreover, as is true under the general common law of federal public
lands, Congress exempted from the OCSLA leasing process portions of
the OCS already reserved to other purposes—“any unit of the National
Park System, National Wildlife Refuge System, or National Marine
133
The OCSLA also
Sanctuary System, or any National Monument.”
explicitly reserves the President’s authority to withdraw unleased OCS
134
lands from disposition under the Act.
The OCSLA, in other words,
treats the OCS as new federal public lands, subject to further
congressional reservation, Presidential withdrawal, and disposition
through leases by the Secretary of the Interior.
V. LATER CONGRESSIONAL PRONOUNCEMENTS ON THE
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF
While the Submerged Lands Act and the OCSLA remain the two
primary federal statutes governing offshore submerged lands, Congress
has since enacted several other statutes that also bear on the status of these
lands as federal public lands. These statutes emphasize that the question
“are offshore submerged lands or the Outer Continental Shelf public
lands?” has no acontextual, a priori answer. Instead, the only relevant
question is whether these lands qualify as federal public lands for a
particular purpose or use.
Congress has continued to describe the nation’s OCS as public
lands, especially with respect to energy development and production. For
example, in connection with the 1978 amendments to the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, the House of Representatives’ committee
report on the legislation repeatedly referred to the outer continental shelf
135
as public lands.
Similarly, in reports on legislation replacing the
Minerals Management Service in the wake of the BP/Deepwater Horizon
133.
Id. at § 1337(p)(10). See also id. at § 1340(h) (“The Secretary shall not
issue a lease or permit for, or otherwise allow, exploration, development, or
production activities within fifteen miles of the boundaries of the Phillip Burton
Wilderness . . . unless the State of California issues a lease or permit for, or otherwise
allows, exploration, development, or production activities on lands beneath navigable
waters . . . of such State which are adjacent to such Wilderness.”).
134.
Id. at § 1341(a).
135.
H.R. Rpt. 95-372 (Aug. 29, 1977) (reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1450, 1485, 1646-47). See also H.R. Rpt. 108-811 (Jan. 3, 2005) (available at 2005
WL 147925) (referring to “an inventory of estimated undiscovered oil and gas
resources beneath public lands (including the outer continental shelf)” and hence
considering the outer continental shelf to be public lands).
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oil spill in 2010, the Senate committee report noted that there is federal
revenue from “both offshore and onshore mineral development on public
136
Most recently, in 2012, the House of Representatives’
lands.”
committee report on the proposed Energy Security and Transportation
Jobs Act clearly included the federally controlled OCS as part of the
137
federal public lands.
Congress has also defined the OCS as federal public lands in other
contexts. For example, the Engle Act explicitly includes the OCS as
“public lands” that the federal government can withdraw or reserve for
138
national defense purposes.
Similarly, in 1964, Congress explicitly
included the OCS as part of the “public lands” subject to the Public Land
139
Law Review Commission’s review process.
Even in the context of the OCSLA, however, there is room for
debate on the exact status of the OCS—particularly when control of its
resources is at stake. In response to a 1985 proposal to move jurisdiction
over the OCSLA in the House of Representatives from the Interior
Committee to the Merchant Marine Committee, for example, the Merchant
Marine Committee argued strongly that the outer continental shelf did not
140
constitute traditional federal public lands.
According to this argument,
“[t]he term ‘public lands’ enjoys two centuries of well-established
meaning as it has been used by the U.S. Congress and interpreted by the
Supreme Court. Two fundamental criteria determine whether or not a land
area constitutes public lands; the holding of title to the area and the ability

136.
Sen. Rpt. 111-236 (July 28, 2010) (available at 2010 WL 2977946, at
*14).
137.
H.R. Rpt. 112-384 (Feb. 9, 2012) (available at 2012 WL 419823, at
**11-12). See also Joseph P. Tomain, Smart Energy Path: How Willie Nelson Saved
the Planet, 36 Cumb. L. Rev. 417, 453 (2005-2006) (including the Outer Continental
Shelf as public lands for purposes of energy development); Kate M. Joyce, U.S.
Energy Policy Since September 2001, 15 Fordham Envtl. L. Rev. 31, 56 (2004)
(noting that “public lands” for purposes of the National Energy Plan “include the
Outer Continental Shelf on the east and west coasts, Alaska’s Bristol Bay and most of
the eastern Gulf of Mexico off the coast of Florida.”).
138.
43 U.S.C. § 155(1) (2006).
139.
Act of Sept. 19, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-606, § 10, 78 Stat. 982, 985
(1964). For a discussion of this review process, see Robert L. Glicksman, Severability
and the Realignment of the Balance of Power Over the Public Lands: The Federal
Land Policy and Management Act After the Legislative Veto Decisions, 36 Hastings
L.J. 1, 69-70 (Sept. 1984).
140.
H.R. Rpt. 99-300 (Oct. 3, 1985) (reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 756,
1084, 1098).
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141

The United States, according to this
to sell or otherwise dispose of it.”
argument, had neither title to the OCS nor the authority to dispose of its
submerged lands; instead, “[e]xcept for the resources related claims of
jurisdiction over the fisheries and mineral deposits of the OCS, the area is
international and beyond U.S. control, as recently reiterated by the
142
President's Exclusive Economic Zone Proclamation.”
This Part examines four other federal statutes under which the
status of the Outer Continental Shelf as federal public lands became
relevant but the statute either explicitly defined “public lands” to not
include the Outer Continental Shelf or was deemed through interpretation
not to extend to those offshore submerged lands. Collectively, what these
statutes suggest most strongly is that the OCS and its resources are
conclusively not subject to state acquisition and control.
A. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) of 1971
Unlike was the case for many Native American groups in the
continental United States, the federal government never entered into
treaties with the various groups of Native Alaskans, leaving their lands
claims unresolved. In 1971, Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claim
143
Settlement Act (“ANSCA”)
after concluding that “there is an
immediate need for a fair and just settlement of all claims by Natives and
144
Native groups of Alaska, based on aboriginal land claims . . . .”
Much of ANCSA operates to designate which lands in Alaska
belong to Native Alaskan groups and villages, which belong to the State of
Alaska, and which belong to the federal government. From the point of
view of Native Alaskans, the primary impact of ANCSA was to extinguish
these groups’ claims to aboriginal title to lands: “[a]ll prior conveyances
of public land and water areas in Alaska, or any interest therein, pursuant
to Federal law, and all tentative approvals pursuant to section 6(g) of the

141.
Id.
142.
Id. at 1084-85. Jurisdiction over the OCSLA in the House of
Representatives now belongs to the Natural Resources Committee and the
Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources. House Committee on Natural
Resources,
Subcommittee
on
Energy
and
Mineral
Resources
(http://naturalresources.house.gov/subcommittees/subcommittee/?SubcommitteeID=5
062 (as viewed Dec. 27, 2012)).
143.
Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (Dec. 18, 1971) (codified at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1629h (2006)).
144.
43 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006).
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Alaska Statehood Act, shall be regarded as an extinguishment of the
145
For these purposes, moreover, ANCSA
aboriginal title thereto, if any.”
defines “public lands” to be:
all Federal lands and interests therein located in Alaska
except: (1) the smallest practicable tract, as determined by
the Secretary, enclosing land actually used in connection
with the administration of any Federal installation, and (2)
land selections of the State of Alaska which have been
patented or tentatively approved under section 6(g) of the
Alaska Statehood Act, as amended (72 Stat. 341, 77 Stat.
223), or identified for selection by the State prior to
146
January 17, 1969 . . . .
ANCSA’s extinguishment of Native claims also clearly applies to
submerged lands, including offshore submerged lands. Specifically, by
operation of the statute, “[a]ll aboriginal titles, if any, and claims of
aboriginal title in Alaska based on use and occupancy, including
submerged land underneath all water areas, both inland and offshore, and
including any aboriginal hunting or fishing rights that may exist, are
147
hereby extinguished.”
As the federal government began to regulate
both fishing above and oil and gas development on the Outer Continental
Shelf off of Alaska, the question became whether this provision extended
to the Outer Continental Shelf or only to Alaska’s three-mile belt of
offshore submerged lands.
Given the history of public lands disposition in Alaska, the U.S.
Supreme Court indicated that ANCSA does not extend to the Outer
Continental Shelf. As the Court explained in 1987:
In the Statehood Act, Congress provided that the State of
Alaska could select over 100 million acres from the
vacant and unreserved “public lands of the United States
in Alaska” within 25 years of its admission. Statehood
Act § 6(b), 72 Stat. 340. Similarly, in ANCSA, Congress
allowed Native Alaskans to select approximately 40
million acres of “Federal lands and interests therein
145.
146.
147.

Id. at § 1603(a).
Id. at § 1602(e).
Id. at § 1603(b).
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located in Alaska,” with the exception of federal
installations and land selections of the State of Alaska
under the Statehood Act. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1602(e), 1610(a),
1611.
We agree with the Secretary that “[i]t is
inconceivable that Congress intended to allow either the
State of Alaska or Native Alaskans to select portions of
the OCS—‘a vital national resource reserve held by the
[government] for the public’ (43 U.S.C. 1332(3)).” Brief
for Petitioners in No. 85-1406, p. 33. Clearly, the purpose
of these provisions was to apportion the land within the
148
boundaries of the State of Alaska.
ANCSA, or at least the Supreme Court’s interpretation of it, as
prompted by the Secretary of the Interior, would thus seem to suggest that
the OCS is not part of the “normal” federal public lands. However, it is
important to emphasize that the Court was giving strong interpretive
weight to the phrase “in Alaska” and that it concluded that federal public
lands “located in Alaska” by definition could not include the OCS because
149
Alaska had no claim whatsoever to those submerged lands.
In context,
therefore, the Supreme Court’s analysis essentially declares that the OCS
can in no way become state land, rather than that it can never be
considered federal public lands.
B. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA)
Congress enacted the Federal Land Policy and Management Act
150
(FLPMA)
in 1976 to provide for comprehensive planning for and
management of certain federal public lands. It announced in FLPMA
national policies to generally keep those lands in federal ownership, to
engage in federal land use planning for those lands, and to recognize the
151
national need for promoting various uses of those lands.
However, the
statute narrowly defines “public lands” to mean “any land and interest in
land owned by the United States within the several States and
administered by the Secretary of the Interior through the Bureau of Land

148.
Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531,
552 (1987) [hereinafter Gambell III].
149.
Id. at 547-49.
150.
43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1787 (2006).
151.
Id. at § 1701(a).
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Management, without regard to how the United States acquired ownership
152
. . . .”
Thus, the federal “public lands” subject to FLPMA’s planning and
management requirements are limited to lands managed by the federal
BLM, and FLPMA itself also operates as the BLM’s organic act.
Congress went further, however, and also explicitly exempted “lands
153
located on the Outer Continental Shelf” from the Act’s scope.
Thus,
OCS lands are clearly not “public lands” for FLPMA purposes.
With regard to this definition, the House Conference Report on
FLPMA notes only that “[t]he conferees retained the traditional use of the
term ‘public lands’ (hereinafter referred to as BLM lands) in referring to
154
the bulk of the lands administered by BLM.”
That report thus
suggested that the OCS was not part of those “traditional” public lands.
Nevertheless, Congress’ perceived need to explicitly exempt the
OCS from FLPMA also cuts another way. If the OCS were clearly not part
of the federal public lands, no such exemption would be necessary. The
explicit exemption of the OCS from FLPMA therefore suggests that
Congress otherwise considers those offshore submerged lands to be a part
of contemporary federal public lands.
C. Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) of 1980
Congress enacted the Alaska National Interest Lands
155
Conservation Act (“ANILCA”)
in 1980 with three purposes: (1) to
preserve and protect “certain lands and waters in the State of Alaska that
contain significant natural, scenic, historic, archeological, geological,
scientific, wilderness, cultural, recreational, and wildlife values;” (2) “to
preserve and protect “unrivaled scenic and geological values associated
with natural landscapes,” wildlife habitat, and Alaskan ecosystems; and
(3) “to provide the opportunity for rural residents [in Alaska] engaged in a
156
subsistence water of life to continue to do so.”
However, ANILCA
also raised considerable questions for Native Alaskans regarding whether
it applied to the OCS.

152.
Id. at § 1702(e).
153.
Id. at § 1702(e)(1).
154.
H.R. Conf. Rpt. 94-1724 at 57 (Sept. 29, 1976) (reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6227, 6229).
155.
16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 (2006).
156.
Id. at § 3101(a), (b), (c).
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ANILCA defines “land” to “mean lands, waters, and interests
157
suggesting that submerged lands might be included. “Federal
therein,”
land,” in turn, is “lands the title to which is in the United States after
158
December 2, 1980.” Finally, the Act defines “public lands” to be:
land situated in Alaska which, after December 2, 1980,
are Federal lands, except—
(A) land selections of the State of Alaska which have been
tentatively approved or validly selected under the Alaska
Statehood Act and lands which have been confirmed to,
validly selected by, or granted to the Territory of Alaska
or the State under any other provision of Federal law;
(B) land selections of a Native Corporation made under
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act which have not
been conveyed to a Native Corporation, unless any such
selection is determined to be invalid or is relinquished;
and
(C) lands referred to in section 19(b) of the Alaska Native
159
Claims Settlement Act.
ANILCA thus suggested that the federal interests in the OCS off
the coast of Alaska rendered those submerged lands not only “Federal
lands” but also “public lands,” at least for purposes of the Act. The issue
came to a head when several Native Alaskan Villages claimed aboriginal
rights to subsistence hunt and fish on the OCS and sought to enjoin oil and
gas leasing there under ANILCA on the ground that such energy
development activities would interfere with the Natives’ hunting and
160
fishing rights.
The district court held both that the Villages held no
such aboriginal rights and that ANILCA did not apply on the Outer
161
Continental Shelf.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the conclusion regarding aboriginal rights but reversed regarding
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at § 3102(1).
Id. at § 3102(2).
Id. at § 3102(3).
Gambell III, 480 U.S. at 535.
Id. at 535-36.
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162

The Ninth Circuit gave
ANILCA, finding that it did apply to the OCS.
two primary reasons for its decision. First, logically and according to
legislative history, the geographic scope of ANILCA should be the same
as the geographic scope of ANCSA, which the Ninth Circuit concluded
163
extended to the OCS
(a conclusion, as discussed above, that the
Supreme Court later undermined). Second, and more importantly,
Congress enacted ANILCA’s subsistence provisions in order to benefit the
Native Alaskans, and under Supreme Court precedent, its scope should be
164
interpreted generously and to the benefit of the tribes.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, concluding that, by statutory
165
definition, ANILCA “public lands” could not include the OCS.
The
Court emphasized that under ANILCA’s definition, quoted above, “public
lands” are “lands in Alaska,” and that the phrase “in Alaska”
has a precise geographic/political meaning.
The
boundaries of the State of Alaska can be delineated with
exactitude. The State of Alaska was “admitted into the
Union on an equal footing with the other States,” and its
boundaries were defined as “all the territory, together with
the territorial waters appurtenant thereto, now included in
the Territory of Alaska.”
Alaska Statehood Act
(Statehood Act) §§ 1, 2, 72 Stat. 339. The Submerged
Lands Act of 1953, 67 Stat. 29, as amended, 43 U.S.C. §
1301 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. III), was made
applicable to the State. Statehood Act § 6(m), 72 Stat.
343. Under § 4 of the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §
1312, the seaward boundary of a coastal State extends to a
line three miles from its coastline. At that line, the OCS
commences. OCSLA § 2(a), 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a). By
definition, the OCS is not situated in the State of
166
Alaska.
Moreover, against arguments (and the Ninth Circuit’s finding) that
Congress had not intended to be so precise, the Supreme Court “reject[ed]
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 536.
People of Gambell v. Clark, 746 F.2d 572, 575, 579-80 (9th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 581.
Gambell III, 480 U.S. at 546-48.
Id. at 547.
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the notion that Congress was merely waving its hand in the general
direction of northwest North America when it defined the scope of
ANILCA as ‘Federal lands’ ‘situated in Alaska.’ Although language
seldom attains the precision of a mathematical symbol, where an
expression is capable of precise definition, we will give effect to that
meaning absent strong evidence that Congress actually intended another
167
meaning.”
As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision, the OCS off Alaska
168
does not qualify as “public lands” for ANILCA purposes.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reached that decision based on
ANILCA’s particular definition of “public lands”—not on the basis of
traditional public land law—and again emphasized that the OCS does not
belong to the states. As a result, it is difficult to conclude that either
ANILCA or the Supreme Court’s interpretation of it resolves for all
contexts the OCS’s federal public lands status.
D. Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987
Offshore submerged lands are the sites of more resources of
interest than just oil and gas, including shipwrecks. Traditionally,
recovery of shipwrecks was governed by the federal admiralty or maritime
169
law of salvage,
but the Submerged Lands Act’s assignment of the first
three miles of offshore submerged lands to the coastal states created issues
regarding state claims to shipwrecks on that part of the continental
170
shelf.
To resolve at least some of those issues, Congress enacted the
171
Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987 in 1988.

167.
Id. at 548.
168.
For a discussion of the further implications of the Supreme Court’s
decision, see Joan M. Nockels, Student Author, Katie John v. United States:
Redefining Federal Public Lands in Alaska, 26 Envtl. L. 693 (1996).
169.
See generally, e.g., The Blackwall, 77 U.S. 1 (1869) (assessing rights to
salvage a British ship that caught fire in San Francisco Bay); The “Sabine,” 101 U.S.
384 (1879) (assessing salvage rights to a steamer that suffered distress on the Ouachita
River on its way to New Orleans).
170.
E.g. Marx v. Government of Guam, 866 F.2d 294, 300 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding that Congress’s extension of the Submerged Lands Act to Guam, especially
in light of the Abandoned Shipwreck Act, gave Guam a colorable claim to shipwrecks
in its territorial waters).
171.
Pub. L. No. 100-298, 102 Stat. 432 (April 28, 1988) (codified at 43
U.S.C. §§ 2101-2106 (2006)).
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Like the Submerged Lands Act, the Abandoned Shipwreck Act
operates to increase state control over resources on the first three miles of
continental shelf. Congress found that “States have the responsibility for
management of a broad range of living and nonliving resources in State
waters and submerged lands,” which included “certain abandoned
shipwrecks, which have been deserted and to which the owner has
172
relinquished ownership rights with no retention.”
Under the somewhat
convoluted operative provisions of the Act, Congress first proclaimed that
the United States holds title to “any abandoned shipwreck that is—(1)
embedded in submerged lands of a State; (2) embedded in coralline
formations protected by a State on submerged lands of a State; or (3) on
submerged lands of a State and is included in or determined eligible for
173
inclusion in the National Register.”
The Act then transfers title to such
shipwrecks “to the State in or on whose submerged lands the shipwreck is
174
located.”
However, “[a]ny abandoned shipwreck in or on the public
lands of the United States is the property of the United States
175
Government.”
As a result, both “submerged lands” and “public lands” are relevant
to the proper disposition of abandoned shipwrecks under the Abandoned
Shipwreck Act. “Submerged lands” for the Act’s purposes are the
offshore submerged lands given to coastal states under the Submerged
Lands Act and similar lands controlled by Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin
Islands, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern
176
Mariana Islands, as defined through other federal statutes.
“Public
lands,” in contrast, are defined with reference to the Archaeological
177
Resource Protection Act of 1979.
The definition of “public lands” in
that Act serves mainly to qualify certain reserved federal lands as “public
lands” for purposes of protecting archaeological resources. Thus:
The term “public lands” means—

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
470ll).

Id. at § 2101.
Id. at § 2105(a).
Id. at § 2105(c).
Id. at § 2105(d).
Id. at § 2102(f).
Pub. L. No. 100-298 at § 2102(c) (referencing 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-
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(A) lands which are owned and administered by the
United States as part of—
(i) the national park system,
(ii) the national wildlife refuge system, or
(iii) the national forest system; and
(B) all other lands the fee title to which is held by the
United States, other than lands on the Outer Continental
Shelf and lands which are under the jurisdiction of the
178
Smithsonian Institution.
As under FLPMA, Congress explicitly removed the OCS from the
relevant definition of “public lands,” exempting the OCS from the
operation of both the Archaeological Resource Protection Act and the
Abandoned Shipwreck Act. The latter exemption makes sense because,
under the terms of the Submerged Lands Act, the states have no claim to
shipwrecks in the federally controlled OCS. As a result, the only
shipwrecks for which the Abandoned Shipwreck Act needed to preserve
federal title were those on or in federally controlled submerged lands
within the first three miles of shore or Florida’s and Texas’s extended
areas of control in the Gulf of Mexico.
In contrast, the exemption of the OCS from the Archaeological
Resource Protection Act, like the exemption in FLPMA, reflects a more
traditional view of federal public lands. Nevertheless, the use of an
explicit exemption also indicates that Congress continued to feel
compelled clarify when the OCS needed to be removed from the operation
of particular federal public land laws. Thus, that Act, like FLPMA,
suggests that Congress continues to believe that the OCS would otherwise
be considered part of the contemporary federal public lands.
VI. CONCLUSION
From one perspective, under contemporary federal public land law,
the status of any particular federal lands as “public lands” has become
entirely a matter of specific statutory definition: lands reserved for
178.

16 U.S.C. § 470bb(3) (2006) (emphasis added).
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national parks and other purposes are federal “public lands” for purposes
of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act but not for purposes of
FLPMA. Like any other federal land, the OCS’s status as “public lands”
depends on the exact regulatory context at issue.
Nevertheless, the public lands debate over the OCS also
demonstrates that there is something special about these submerged lands.
First, the continental shelf is a relatively new acquisition, not
contemplated as part of the traditional federal public lands and often still
irrelevant to traditional public lands management concerns such as public
access and recreation. Second, the OCS is decidedly federal, placed and
kept beyond the states’ control and jurisdiction except as allowed under
the Submerged Lands Act. Finally, fee simple title to the OCS is a fuzzier
issue than it is for the federal government’s terrestrial lands, leading many
to conclude that this region can never be considered federal public lands.
Nevertheless, in the context of natural resource—and especially
energy—development, Congress views the OCS as federal public lands on
which private mineral development is to be encouraged. While oil spills
and environmental concerns have tempered the offshore oil rush since
1953, Congress has never fundamentally changed the idea embedded in
the OCSLA that the federal government holds the OCS primarily for
disposal to private development of petroleum, natural gas, and other
minerals. As such, the OCS comprises federal lands for which, at least
until reservation or withdrawal, the United States can dispose of private
property interests, rendering the OCS meaningfully indistinguishable from
any other federal public lands.

